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'Freedom of Press, Speech, Assembly, Meetings and Demonstrations'

Like the provisions for 'free elections', these rights exist only on paper. A comparison of the papers published in the different 'People's Democracies', the contents of the speeches made and so on, proves this. The extent to which the 'freedoms' exist is particularly obvious when there is any abrupt change of policy. For instance, up to the day on which Rajk was arrested, all the papers in Hungary competed in singing his praises, at meetings his name was mentioned side by side with Rákosi's and at demonstrations—the last, that of 1st May, 1949—his picture was very prominent and, according to the Hungarian press, the cheers he drew from the crowd were second only to Rákosi. When on 15th June, 1949, it was announced that Rajk had been arrested as a 'Titoist-fascist', all the press, without exception, attacked him in a most vicious manner. Within a week, the press was full of telegrams from meetings all over the country demanding 'punishment without mercy' for Rajk, and workers demanded 'A rope for traitors like Rajk', even before the date of his trial was announced. Not *one* of the thousands who had voted for him a month earlier when he headed the list of candidates in the Parliamentary elections made use of their 'freedom of the press and speech' (Article 55 of the Constitution) to propose to withhold judgment until the trial, far less to defend him. Furthermore, the people knew exactly what punishment would be meted out months before the trial. The rope was repeatedly demanded and he was indeed hanged. The mass meetings before Mindszenty's trial never demanded the death sentence but severe punishment; Mindszenty received a long prison sentence. Freedom of the press, speech, assembly, meetings and demonstrations amounts to the 'freedom' of the people to say exactly what the Government wants them to say.

To enhance 'freedom' of the press, the sale of books dating from before the rule of the 'People's Democracies' is prohibited by Government decree. The Czechoslovak Government on January 10th, 1950, banned the sale of all books published in Czechoslovakia before May 5th, 1945, with the exception of certain specified text-books for schools and scientific journals, ordered all booksellers to clear their shelves of them within

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With certain notable exceptions involving injustice to new German, Magyar, and Ruthenian minorities, the boundaries were drawn about as close to linguistic frontiers as economic and geographic viability permitted. The trouble lay less with the peacemakers than with the principle of national self-determination, especially when applied without the two compensating factors stipulated in Wilson's program: free trade and international organization. The shortcomings of this un-Wilsonian settlement were serious, and cast a long shadow over the next generation. Central among these shortcomings was the exaggerated emphasis on the spirit of exclusive state nationalism, a natural but in the end disastrous consequence of the prolonged concern with national liberation. This spirit, in its postwar manifestations, became an obstacle to the solution of the many boundary disputes, raised protective trade barriers around the new states to the point of self-strangulation, and prevented the organization of a sound system of collective security.

II

Although the hope of the Eastern European leaders for the spiritual and material development of their peoples was placed increasingly in national liberation, it should not be forgotten that in the century after 1815 the peoples of this region made significant gains in the process of modernization. This process, considered as the expansion of human rights within a framework of increasing productivity and distribution in all branches of the economy, developed at an uneven rate in the different parts of Eastern Europe. In the broadest sense, modernization may be considered as the transition from a feudal and agrarian to a democratic and industrialized society, and in this region it involved certain characteristic steps. The most important of these steps were: the growth in human rights, of which the political

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were by far the most important; the increase of educational opportunities and general culture; and the development of the economy through agricultural improvement and the expansion of industry and trade.

Political freedom in Eastern Europe before the First World War ranged in degree from negligible rights, as those of the Slovaks in Hungary or of the Poles in Russia, to independent states with constitutions of strongly democratic tendencies, as in certain countries of Southeastern Europe. The latter had been influenced by Western models, and made provision for parliamentary government based on wide suffrage. The constitutions of Serbia, Rumania, and Bulgaria, drafted in the latter half of the nineteenth century by native statesmen experienced in the ways of Western constitutionalism, were founded on a genuine faith in democracy. It is true that royal or ministerial authoritarianism and resort to rough methods were not uncommon in these countries, yet the social egalitarianism already prevailing in Serbia and Bulgaria was a strong force for democracy in these countries. Although illiteracy and political inexperience remained a serious obstacle to orderly government, the generation before the First World War offers significant examples of governments being changed by orderly democratic procedures. Illustrative of the difficulties under which popular elections with universal male suffrage were conducted is the fact that in the Bulgarian election of 1880 only 32 per cent of those eligible to vote cast their ballots, in contrast to about 80 per cent in France and Belgium and 60 per cent in Germany and Italy in the period 1875-80.

Hungary had a longer tradition of constitutional government than did the Balkan states and after 1867 was in most respects an independent state, but its social structure was more conservative and its desire for political democracy less evident. Moreover, the Magyar achievement of political autonomy was marred by the oppressive treatment of the

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to the belief that human language is unable to express the whole truth about the greatest disgrace to mankind that the twentieth century will know—the Soviet forced labor camps.

A sentence to a forced labor camp amounts to a sentence of death because the enormous majority of the inmates in these camps cannot exist under the conditions prevailing there and die before they are released. The inmate of such a camp works beyond his strength, knowing that if his productivity falls his starvation-level food ration will be cut. The instinct for self-preservation urges him to defend himself from death, and his reactions become those of a hungry animal. All his human feelings disappear, even his attitude toward his fellow inmates. Degraded and humiliated as a human being, the prisoner works like an animal for his enemies only to prolong his life by a year or two and then inevitably to perish.

Political freedom does not exist in the Communist countries either under law or in practice. Let us take for example Article 72 of the Polish constitution of July 1952. Similar provisions will be found in all other Communist constitutions. The first lines of Article 72 say that the citizens have the right of political organization, but the third paragraph of the same article says that organization of assemblies and participation in an organization which opposes the political and social system of People's Poland are forbidden. In other words, any party which does not recognize the Communist political system is forbidden, and membership in it is punishable.

Since membership in a political party presupposes some right to influence that party, the question arises whether the Communists find it advisable to allow every citizen to belong to his country's Communist Party. The answer is no. The official statistics of the Communist parties in the occupied countries as well as in the Soviet Union show that the number of members of these parties ranges from 5 to 10 per cent

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641 of the population of the given country. Finally, even the 665 internal structure of the Communist Party is dictatorial. The delegates of the local organizations accept only the projects and decisions of the party elite or of the chief dictator.

641 The Rumanian constitution, just like the others, appears to guarantee freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of public processions and manifestations. Article 85 states that "These rights are ensured by placing at the disposal of the working masses and their organizations printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets, communications facilities and other material requisites." In practice, the printing presses, paper mills, public buildings, radio, and so forth are owned by the state and are completely controlled by the leadership of the Communist Party. Even religious processions and manifestations require the consent of the state.

641 In theory, under the Communist system, every citizen over 666 eighteen years of age has the right to vote. In practice, the elections are a tragic farce. They do not mean the right to select a candidate, to participate in the adoption of a party program, or even to defend social or national interests. They signify a compulsion to vote for one's hated enemies. The elector is forced to march to the polls to the accompaniment of music played by his foes while pain wrenches his heart and his fists clench in hatred and anger. The official results of the elections always show that the candidates of the Communist Party have received 99 per cent of the votes.

602 Does the administration of justice stand guard over civil 641 liberties? No, it definitely does not, either in practice or in theory. The constitutions of the People's Republics have clear provisions in this respect. Article 41 of the Hungarian constitution states: "The courts shall punish the enemies of the people, defend and secure the political, economic and social order of the People's Democracy . . . they shall edu-

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cate the workers to respect the rule of socialist communal life." The Polish and Rumanian constitutions of 1952 provide that "The courts defend the system of People's Democracy and the gains of the working people, and ensure the people's law, social property and citizens' rights."

In practice it is always the duty of the judge and the prosecutor to take the side of the Communist State—that is, of the Communist Party. It is always the duty of the defense to help the state prosecute the accused and to help him to accuse himself. The defendant's duty is to prove his guilt. The courts are a tool of the Communist regimes and are not independent institutions for the administration of justice. Communism introduces not only the judicial murder of innocent people but a debasement of man unparalleled in the history of mankind. The innocent defendant is forced to accuse himself of crimes which he has never committed, to accuse other innocent people, to trample upon his own dignity, to humiliate himself in the eyes of his friends and family, to spit upon the ideals in which he has believed, and to praise the loathsome practices of his enemy and prosecutor as he awaits death by the hands of his oppressor or by slow agony in a prison or forced labor camp.

V

Although it proclaims the liberation of the masses, the communist system has created unprecedented privilege for the ruling Communist elite. Everyone who has seen the living conditions of the highest Communist dignitaries in Russia as well as in the captive countries knows that these men enjoy a very high standard of living. They have privileges in all spheres of life—political, economic, social, and cultural. The life of the Communist elite is, however, not to be envied. Generally, the members of this group are hated. They are constantly threatened, even by the members of

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641 565 their own party. They live a life of fear in a golden cage, from which they cannot withdraw, even if they wish to do so.

In a democratic state a president elected to office lives like any free and private citizen. Under the Communist system this is unthinkable. The system of privileges finds support even in Communist theory. "It is time it was understood that Marxism is an enemy of equalization," Stalin stated in his report to the Seventeenth Communist Congress in January of 1934. "By equality Marxism means, not equalization of individual requirements and individual life, but abolition of classes. . . ." In the same connection he quoted Lenin's statement that "the claim that we want to make all men equal to one another is an empty phrase and a stupid invention of intellectuals."[4]

641 Freedom of religion and of faith under the Communist system does not exist, either in theory or in practice. The first articles of Communist constitutions always proclaim many civil liberties. But, when we analyze more closely the following passages of these articles, we see that as a rule they contradict and abolish the provisions contained in the first lines. Let us take for example, Article 70 of the constitution of the Polish People's Republic, which appears to guarantee the citizens freedom of conscience and of faith. It also says, however, that abuse of freedom of faith for purposes detrimental to the interest of the Polish People's Republic is punishable. In practice, of course, this means that every pronouncement against the atheistic and materialistic principles of the Communist system is detrimental to the People's Republic and is therefore punishable.

641 793 But that is not all. The Communists who proclaim the division between the church and the state do not intend to leave any freedom to the church. They demand the clergy's help in the building of socialism and consider any refusal to be detrimental to the interests of the People's State. In

[4] Joseph Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, pp. 521-522.

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practice, church organizations and the clergy are meant to have no function but that of a helpful tool in the communization of the nation.

The function of education is the same. The Communists do not even pretend to support freedom of knowledge and bluntly state in their legislation that the duty of higher schools is to educate the younger generation in the spirit of socialist dialectics and materialistic doctrines. Theoretically, the Communist system assures the youth of education. In practice, an individual's right to education is not determined by intellectual ability and progress but by membership in the Young Communist League (Komsomol), by informing on "unorthodox" professors, and by success in examinations on Communist politics and doctrines.

The articles of the Communist constitutions that deal with the rights of the citizens stress above all the rights to work, rest, and medical treatment. The Communist attitude toward the individual is like that of the horse-owner when he thinks that the main duty of his animal is to work and believes that it must be assured of rest and medical treatment only to insure the fulfillment of this duty. Actually, most farmers in the free countries treat their animals better than the Communists treat the people. Out of hatred, the Communists destroy whole social groups and even perpetrate the genocide of whole nations.

The Communists claimed that when they had freed the working man from capitalist exploitation they would not allow the exploitation of one man by another. Is this claim realized in practice? Again, the answer is no. The Communist state created the worst kind of exploitation by giving the rule of the people to the Communist elite and by providing this elite with the formidable weapons of both police and army. In a democratic state, even where large industries and sources of raw materials are nationalized, the interests of the people are guarded by trade unions, politi-

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661 cal parties, legislation, courts, and the police who protect
665 the security of the citizens. The state authority is the mediator in the last resort in disagreements between labor and business.

661 The Moloch, which is the Communist state, has on its
466 side the party, the police, and the courts. Special laws con-
641 stantly increase the penalties for the plunder and destruction of the nationalized public property. Because the state is a "people's state" and "does not do injustice to the people," the trade unions act as a tool of the state in raising the productivity and quality of production and fixing the norms of work. The Stakhanovite work system, based on high norms of production and granting starvation-level wages with no means of protection against these, destroys the strength and health of the worker. Strikes are punishable because they are crimes against the interests of the state, and special laws provide discipline of work, penalties for failure to fulfill norms, and forced labor camps for "idlers" and "loafers."

661 Communism deprives the peasant of his beloved land,
641 turns him into a Communist serf, and chains him to the
423 state or collective farm in which the Communist bureaucracy demands of him ever-increasing physical efforts to produce for the insatiable state. After the liquidation of the remnants of private initiative in small business and crafts, the *kulak* peasant, the biggest "capitalist blood-sucker," is dealt with. He is destroyed by tax levies and forced deliveries of agricultural products and is finally evicted from his own farm.

642 Thus, behind the façade of People's Democracy, Communism practices dictatorship in every sphere of life—personal, political, economic, religious, and social. The Communist system creates privileges for the party and makes the citizen economically dependent upon the state. It debases human dignity, wrests faith out of human hearts, kills

The liberation of the peasantry was a consequence of the demands of the new liberal movement and was one of the achievements of the liberal regimes which gained momentum on the Continent after the Napoleonic era. This European liberalism had been a result of the struggle of the bourgeoisie against the old political and economic order upheld previously by the aristocracy. It originated in the theory of natural rights, as interpreted by French political philosophers of the eighteenth century, and included in its doctrine the postulate of political, economic, and social freedom and equality for all individuals.

However, it would be wrong to assume that the formal liberation of the peasantry was an immediate result of its emulation of other classes of society, in particular, of the bourgeoisie. On the contrary, the struggle for the realization of peasant rights had still to be fought.

The ruling regimes imposed political restrictions that were usually based on the tax census system and barred large masses of the peasant population from their right to vote in parliamentary elections. In many of the countries, it was not until the end of the First World War that complete franchise was granted to the peasantry.

Economic freedom, as advocated and practiced by liberalism, soon began to undermine the foundations of the peasant economy. The peasantry, which under feudalism had paid most of its rents and other fees to the landlord in natural produce, was placed suddenly in the midst of a complicated money-economy in which the autarkic arrangements of the peasant familistic economy were no longer valid. Peasant land, which throughout centuries had changed little in price or in value, was suddenly submitted to wide fluctuations in value as a consequence of the rapid development of the communication system and the erection of industrial plants. The appearance of a money-economy created the necessity of establishing an appropriate credit system which heretofore had been lacking completely in the peasant orbit. The state,

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641 565 178 however, following its policy of economic freedom, did not deem it necessary to intervene in this problem, and left the peasants open to the merciless exploitation of private banks and usurers. Economic individualism, accentuated by liberalism, induced individual members of the large peasant family groups, known among the Southern Slavs as *zadrugas*, to seek their economic independence. This process provoked a hasty and uncontrolled parcellation of the peasant land and contributed further to the economic weakness and inefficiency of the peasant system of farming.

The solemnly proclaimed social equality of the peasant was a farce. The ruling groups, derived from the bourgeoisie, the newly created bureaucracy, and the remnants of the aristocratic elements, looked upon the peasants with contempt and mistrust, considering them, although necessary to agrarian production, neither fitted nor qualified to take part in politics or public affairs. Social inequality was expressed both by the attitude of dominant ethnical groups to the "peoples of lower categories" and by the division within these groups between intelligentsia and the common people, or peasants.

Obviously, remedies were sought to correct the adverse conditions created in the liberal era, but before these are discussed, it is necessary to credit liberalism for those ideas and measures which, in principle, were universally accepted by the masses and which made possible their political organization. Generally speaking, the ideas of political freedom and of general education and a belief in the individual's capabilities were the stimulating forces behind the organization of the people. However, these ideas did not save liberalism, but prepared the road for its destruction.

829 The first reaction to the flaws in liberalism was the appearance of the "scientific socialism" of Karl Marx. It is important to note that this philosophy was conceived exclusively for the newly created industrial proletariat. The peasants, if

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has no preference for any particular religious denomination and is for this reason better adapted to the peasantry. 829 668

Finally, peasantism rejects definitely the political and social concepts of modern totalitarianism. Totalitarian and undemocratic regimes in Eastern Europe during the interwar period were always upheld by military cliques, aristocratic and bureaucratic groups, or by the ruling dynasties whose aims were to keep the power at all costs and whose political methods and social views were diametrically opposed to the fundamental principles of peasantism.

Politically, peasantism advocates a system of parliamentarianism with two additional features: accentuation of local self-government and direct participation in the government of the greatest number of people. Economically, peasantism favors free cooperatives because it believes that cooperation preserves the principles of private property and permits the exercise of private initiative. The latter is favored when cooperative arrangements are not adequate to meet economic requirements.

III

Although the peasant movements and parties were initiated before the First World War, they achieved their full strength and political significance only after the war was over. There were three causes for this postwar rise of peasant political organizations: the formation of the national states, the universal franchise, and the agrarian reforms. 668 641

The formation of national states in Eastern Europe contributed enormously to the development of political life. While the people of this area had heretofore directed most of their political endeavors against the oppression of the ruling nations, in the new era they directed their efforts toward the solution of vital economic and social issues. 641

Universal franchise enabled the peasant population to

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641 participate in national elections and thus intensified the activities of the peasant political organizations. Only a decade earlier, because of the tax census system, none but a limited number of the peasants were entitled to vote, but in the national democratic states this right was granted to every male citizen over twenty-one years of age.

423 In Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, a considerable number of agrarian reforms were accomplished which distributed large surfaces of arable land to individual peasants. They thus became economically independent and from then on were valiant champions of the peasant program. No substantial land reform was carried out in Hungary until 1945.

642 Unfortunately, the initial success of the peasant parties was not given political effect everywhere and, where peasant regimes were established, they were not of long duration. The advances of the peasant parties were neutralized soon by the counter actions of totalitarian elements which were opposed to democratic principles in general, and to peasant political and social concepts in particular. The peasant parties, faithful to their programs, favored and supported genuinely democratic systems and cooperated with other democratic groups but, with the disappearance of the democratic order, their own position became precarious. It must be admitted that the complicated machinery of a democratic regime was unable to run smoothly at all times in the newly established national states, except in Czechoslovakia. However, this deficiency should not be interpreted as a lack of interest in democratic institutions nor as a disapproving attitude toward the principles of freedom which symbolize Western political thought. The democratic regimes came up against a complex of problems whose complete, satisfactory, and early settlement was somewhat unreasonably expected by the newly created national states. Profiting from these adverse and interrelated domestic conditions, the totalitarian elements found inter-

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people accept them as their due and can no longer visualize life without them. A large and, according to official claims, growing part of national income is being spent on social insurance, public health, family allowances, maternity and children care, workers' vacations, so-called physical culture, and the like. There is no comparison between the philosophy of the welfare state in Britain and that of Communism in Eastern Europe, but there are some similar functions in both systems. For much the same reasons that the Conservative government in London could never think of taking back the social reforms of the Labor government, no post-Communist government in Eastern Europe will be able to consider curtailing the privileges accorded to the working class by the present regimes.

V

The most important and politically the most decisive of the privileges granted by the State is education, understood always strictly in the Communist sense of the term. The Communist regimes are aware that they cannot seriously expect to win the minds of the majority of the adult population. Anyone who was twenty years old in 1938 in Bohemia or Moravia, in 1939 in Poland, in 1941 in Serbia, and as late as 1944 in Hungary or Rumania, can contrast his present situation as an individual and as a part of his nation to his situation under a non-Communist government, however imperfect the latter may have been. There is no way of knowing how many of these men and women regret the past and hate the present, but they undoubtedly constitute a large majority of the adult population of the area. From the Communist point of view, these men and women are incurable. The future of the Red regimes depends on the youngsters who know nothing about the past, are isolated from the freedoms of the West, and are daily taught that Russia is their shin-

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641 ing example. The regime knows that it cannot assure a decent
208 standard of living to the adult population and probably realizes that the coming generation will not live much better. However, it hopes that the young ones will be more pliable. Since they will not know that life can be better, they will not grumble. In the political and moral field, the desire to capture the minds of the youth is what industrialization is in the economic domain—the primary goal to which all others
185 must be subordinated. From another angle, education, especially technical education, is the necessary counterpart and precondition of the fully industrialized, urbanized, and mechanized socialist society.

168 The first point of the Communist program for the young
185 generation is to insure its numerical strength. Before the last war, the populations of Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Slovakia were increasing with great though gradually diminishing rapidity. In the Czech lands proper and in Hungary, the natural increase was low with a trend towards demographic standstill. Some economists believed that the key problem of Eastern Europe, that of rural poverty due to overpopulation, could not be solved unless the population ceased to multiply so rapidly. From the strictly economic point of view, there was much truth in that assertion. The Communist regimes, including that of Yugoslavia, have taken the opposite stand. Their publications wage a war against the prewar theory which they say is born of despondency characteristic of capitalism. Communism, they claim, will solve all problems. But to prosper, People's Democracies need many children. Whether because of these social policies or because of other reasons, the prewar trend toward low natality has been reversed in most countries of the area. No demographic data on Rumania have been published for some years, which may mean that the policy of high natality has not been successful there. Elsewhere, data show that many more children are being born now than before the war and

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overwhelmingly peasant character, its political apathy and military weakness.

Today, in the middle of the twentieth century, most of these conditions have been transformed. All the peoples of Eastern Europe have literate majorities. They have native professional and middle classes. All of them have at least some more or less modern industries and transportation systems. All of them have had two or three generations of broad national and political development, a flourishing of national languages and literatures, and a vigorous growth in native political participation. They have memories of national independence and skills of political organization and action. They can no longer be ruled by alien rulers, and even the Russian dictatorship must deal with them by indirect methods. The peoples of Eastern Europe today can be governed stably only by native political administrations, by native civil services and school systems, and by the appeal—however distorted—to native symbols and traditions, or they cannot be governed at all.

All these changes seem to be irreversible. It would be as difficult to restore illiteracy, apathy, and fundamental ignorance to the peoples of Eastern Europe as it would be to restore the economic and social institutions of 1853. If history teaches us anything, it is at the very least that the distribution of political and military power is subject to rapid change and that every submerged people that has preserved its identity and its capacity to think and act may well expect to find again some opportunity to determine its own destiny in freedom.

II

Yet all was not well with the growth of sovereign states in Eastern Europe. Perhaps the most characteristic feature of the political institutions of the area was the widespread

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641 discontent with them. If people had resented the oppressiveness of the old large empires, many now chafed under the smallness and divisiveness of the national states that had come to succeed them. Eastern European states, large or small, seemed to have a way of frustrating the hopes and ambitions of significant numbers of their citizens. Where men had complained about the lack of national freedom in the past, many now complained about the "balkanization" of the region. It is this underlying restlessness, this *malaise* of Eastern European politics, that gave a peculiar appeal to the demand for Eastern European federation. If we are to understand the prospects and the problems of a federal union in this region, we must first turn our attention to the fundamental needs and discontents that gave rise to the proposal.

175 433 Eastern Europe was a relatively backward area in terms of economic development. Even some of its most highly developed regions, such as the countries of Austria, Hungary, and the Russian-held parts of Poland, had lagged in economic development during the two crucial generations between 1815 and 1875, during which time most Western countries went through decades of tremendous economic growth.[1] In 1850

[1] Cf. Paul Muller, "Osterreich seit 1848," in Hans Mayer, ed., *Hundert Jahre Osterreichischer Wirtschaftsentwicklung*, 1848-1948, (Vienna: Springer Verlag, 1949), pp. 1-20, esp. p. 8; and in the same volume, for the old monopolistic traditions of business at Vienna from 1221 to 1848, and "conditions bordering on lethargy" during the decades preceding 1848, see Otto Gruss, "Ein Jahrhundert Osterreichischer Binnenhandel (1848-1948)," pp. 310-358, esp. pp. 311-317; for figures on the slow introduction of steam engines, the lag in the growth of towns, the slow relative growth of the population occupied in industry, the lack of capital, the national fragmentation of markets, etc., see Karl Heinz Werner, "Osterreichs Industrie und Aussenhandelspolitik 1848 bis 1948," *ibid.*, pp. 359, 479, esp. pp. 624-678, esp. p. 659. See also J. Slokar, *Geschichte der osterreichischen Industrie* (Vienna: Tempsky, 1949), pp. 16-19, 46-54, 177-179; Richard Schuller, "Die Entstehung des osterreichisch-ungarischen Wirtschaftsgebietes," in G. Gratz and R. Schuller, *Der wirtschaftliche Zusammenbruch Osterreich-Ungarns* (Vienna and New Haven: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky and Yale University Press, 1930), pp. 1-35, esp. pp. 23-24; Oscar Jaszi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), pp. 185-212.

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186 be improved by secession. All of them thought that they could
178 improve their position by finding that exact size of political unit in which their own language and their own national culture could be made to predominate and in which their own nationality or ethnic group could be turned into the leading class or social and political elite.

Nationalism in Eastern Europe was thus a reaction to the rapid diffusion of Western claims and to the expectations of security and opportunity throughout a group of societies that were only slowly, if at all, acquiring the productive skill and equipment to satisfy them. National secession, national expansion, and the national state appeared to almost all nationalities in the region as plausible short cuts to the prosperity, power, and prestige they all desired.

178 In the course of events, the experiment was actually made.
433 The Austro-Hungarian monarchy was destroyed and a num-
●641 ber of successor states arose from its remains. There is no doubt on the whole that the emergence of these national states represented a significant step forward toward higher levels of popular participation in public affairs, toward political democracy, toward popular education, and even, in some respects, toward greater economic opportunities. But at the same time it seems clear that the change in the size of political units did little or nothing to come to grips with the fundamental causes of the poverty and backwardness of the region, or with the fundamental sources of its peculiar psychological and political frustrations and resentments. National and regional markets and consumer preferences remained as small and as unfavorable to mass production in the new states as they had in the old. Capital remained as scarce and productive investment as uneven and erratic as before.
178 Tools, technologies, and work habits changed slowly if at
[735] all. Poverty persisted. Purchasing power remained low and
464 prices high. Production remained scattered over many small and inefficient factories. Innovations were accepted reluc-